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Abstract We evaluate data on choices made from convex time budgets (CTB) in
Andreoni and Sprenger (Am Econ Rev 102(7):3333–3356, 2012a) and Augenblick
et al. (Q J Econ 130(3):1067–1115, 2015), two influential studies that proposed and
applied this experimental technique. We use the weak axiom of revealed preference
(WARP) to test for external consistency relative to pairwise choice, and demand,
wealth and impatience monotonicity to test for internal consistency. We find that
choices made by subjects in the original Andreoni and Sprenger (Am Econ Rev
102(7):3333–3356, 2012a) paper violate WARP frequently; violations of all three
internal measures of monotonicity are concentrated in subjects who take advantage
of the novel feature of CTB by making interior choices. Wealth monotonicity
violations are more prevalent and pronounced than either demand or impatience
monotonicity violations. We substantiate the importance of our desiderata of choice
consistency in examining effort allocation choices made in Augenblick et al. (Q J
Econ 130(3):1067–1115, 2015), where we find considerably more demand mono-
tonicity violations, as well as many classical monotonicity violations which are
associated with time inconsistent behavior. We believe that the frequency and
magnitude of WARP and monotonicity violations found in the two studies pose
important confounds for interpreting and structurally estimating choice patterns
elicited through CTB. We encourage researchers employing CTB in present and
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1 Introduction
Elicitation of time preferences in the discounted utility (DU) model requires
simultaneous estimation of the felicity and discount functions. To demonstrate,
consider a subject whose preferences over consumption streams are represented by a
time-invariant1 DU model, and decides at time 0 on her consumption in periods t
and t þ k. Her utility is given by U ct; ctþkð Þ ¼ D tð Þu ctð Þ þ D t þ kð Þu ctþkð Þ, where
D ð Þ is the subject’s discount function, and u ð Þ is her felicity function. Estimation
of a discount function that is based on indifference between consumption of c1 at
time t and c2 [ c1ð Þ at time t þ k (and nothing in the other period), e.g. through
multiple price list (MPL), implies that D t þ kð Þ=D tð Þ ¼ u c1ð Þ=u c2ð Þ. It is well
known that if the researcher assumes linear u ð Þ while the true felicity function is
concave, it will bias the estimated D t þ kð Þ=D tð Þ downwards.2
To cope with this difficulty Andersen et al. (2008) used the fact that under the
standard Discounted Expected Utility model risk and time preferences are
intimately linked: a concave utility function exhibits both atemporal risk aversion
and a desire for intertemporal smoothing of consumption. Their double multiple
price list (MPL) procedure uses one atemporal multiple price list to estimate risk
preferences and a second intertemporal multiple price list to estimate time
preferences. They use the curvature of the atemporal utility function in order to
adjust the estimation of the discount function.
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a, abbreviated exchangeably as AS in the
following) proposed an interesting alternative according to which a single
instrument can be used to jointly estimate the felicity and discount functions,
without explicitly relying on the subject’s risk preferences. Andreoni and Sprenger’s
convex time budgets (CTB) are a convexification of pairwise choices made on lines
in the intertemporal MPL and allow the economist to directly measure intertemporal
substitution. In their design the subject faces linear experimental budgets, which
allow her to choose interior allocations between payments at two time periods (t and
t þ k). One can rationalize such interior allocations if the subject’s preferences
between ct and ctþk are (weakly) convex. It thus provides a way to directly adjust
the measurement of the subject’s discount function for intertemporal substitution
without the need to explicitly invoke expected utility.3 Andreoni and Sprenger
(2012a), and their closely related study (Andreoni and Sprenger 2012b), have been
followed by a large number of applications and comments.4
1 It is often assumed that preferences are time invariant (stable) so that Ds  D and us  u for all s 0.
For experimental evidence on the validity of this assumption see Halevy (2015).
2 Since if u is concave then c1=c2\uðc1Þ=u c2ð Þ for c1\c2.
3 Some form of event separability is still required for incentive compatibility.
4 Recently, Attema et al. (2016) proposed a Direct Method to measure the discount function that relies on
ranking of accumulate income, and does not require the adjustment to the curvature of the felicity function.
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The current paper provides commentary and guidance for economists who wish
to use CTB to measure time preferences. Specifically, we discuss a methodology for
measuring the consistency of subject-level choices with a very general model of
intertemporal choice (more general than the DU model). A key element of this
methodology requires the inclusion of two convex budgets that differ only in their
income level in the CTB design, which makes a direct test of wealth monotonicity
possible.5 We illustrate our approach using the data set of AS (on time allocation of
money) and on the most influential application of CTB to date—the work of
Augenblick et al. (2015), which investigates allocation of effort over time.
In the AS study, we find surprisingly high rates of violations of the general model
of intertemporal choice that we consider. For the subjects who did not exhibit any
curvature in their CTB choices, we directly estimate their discount factor based on
the three choice lists and the corresponding CTBs assuming linearity of the felicity
function, for the sake of comparison. We find WARP violations between choices
made on CTB and choice lists for these subjects, and most of these violations are in
the direction of exhibiting lower impatience in CTB than in choice lists. This could
be an explanation for why Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a) obtain reasonably high
CTB discount factors for these subjects even though their discount factors are not
adjusted upward (as there is no evidence that their felicity function is concave). In
the Augenblick et al. (2015) paper we find substantial rates of demand monotonicity
violations, especially in their replication study. The latter violations are accompa-
nied by violations of classical monotonicity, which in turn are empirically
associated with time inconsistent behavior. Choices that violate classical mono-
tonicity cannot be rationalized by a monotone utility function, a fact that relates this
finding to the literature on ‘‘decision-making quality’’ (Choi et al. 2014)—if
rationalizability of choices by a utility function is a marker of choice quality, then
there is definitely some relation between the decision making quality and adherence
to the normative standard of time consistency. We believe these surprising findings
highlight the importance of implementing our suggested methodology before and
after using CTB data for estimation.
In what follows, we suggest possible behavioral mechanisms (for example,
magnitude effect, reference dependence, subject confusion, experimental design)
that may generate the observed inconsistencies. We hope that our work encourages
future research to further address these questions.
1.1 Consistency requirements and summary of results
We identify three basic properties that allocations in a CTB design should satisfy in
order to be rationalizable by a very general model of intertemporal choice:
allocations should satisfy wealth monotonicity (normality) implying that ct and ctþk
should be weakly increasing in wealth, holding interest rate constant; ct should be
weakly decreasing in interest rate (demand monotonicity), holding the dates t and
5 This comparative static treatment was included in the original AS paper, but as will be clear below, we
believe that the original paper did not emphasize its importance for evaluating the internal consistency of
choices.
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t þ k and wealth normalized to the later date constant, with ct strictly decreasing
whenever ðct; ctþkÞ is interior; allocations should be consistent with impatience
implying that as the later (earlier) date is shifted away from the present, ct should
weakly increase (decrease), holding the earlier (later) date, price ratio and wealth
constant. Additionally, we use the fact that AS also included some multiple price
lists in their design to test for violations of the weak axiom of revealed preferences
(WARP). The various monotonicity criteria for which we evaluate the empirical
demand should not be confused with monotonicity of the utility function with
respect to ct; ctþkð Þ: In particular, wealth and demand monotonicity are conse-
quences of the very weak assumption that ct and ctþk are normal goods. When
choices are inconsistent with monotonicity of the utility function we say that they
violate ‘‘classical monotonicity.’’
We document the level of adherence of choices (at the individual level) to the
above very mild external and internal consistency requirements. We find a very high
level of WARP violations among the many subjects who made corner choices in
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a). Violations of all three internal measures of
monotonicity are concentrated in subjects who make interior choices and thereby
take advantage of the novel feature of Andreoni and Sprenger’s CTB experimental
design. Wealth monotonicity violations are more prevalent and pronounced than
either demand or impatience monotonicity violations (except when all choices are
interior).
We then investigate the consistency of choices in the Augenblick et al. (2015)
study. This is the most significant application of CTB to date, as it tries to
distinguish discounting of primary rewards (or costs—implemented through an
effort task) from discounting of monetary rewards (as in the majority of
experimental studies of intertemporal preferences). One of the important findings
of Augenblick et al. (2015) is that subjects tend to make interior choices much more
often when deciding on allocation of effort than of money, and that there is
significantly more time inconsistency (in the form of present bias) in effort.
Augenblick et al. (2015) includes two experiments: the design of the first
experiment may confound present bias with other sources of time inconsistency,6
and the second experiment was designed in order to eliminate some of these
potential confounds. Although Augenblick et al. (2015) did not include some of the
important comparative static treatments that were part of Andreoni and Sprenger
(2012a), we are still able to test for demand monotonicity. In the first experiment we
find levels of demand non-monotonicity in effort that are comparable to interior
choices (on the allocation of money) made in AS. However, in the replication study
we find higher levels of demand monotonicity violations, that we could not account
for even after taking into account rounding effects that allowed subjects to make
choices that are inconsistent with monotone preferences and a higher number of
interest rates faced by subjects. Additionally, we find that non-adherence to classical
monotonicity is significantly associated with time inconsistent choices.
We believe that the findings reported here motivate the following fundamental
question: are choices made in CTB reflective of deep and stable preferences? We
6 See Augenblick et al. (2015, p. 1106) and Halevy (2015, p. 350).
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urge researchers to study the source of the documented inconsistent behavior in
order to decide if it could be attributed to the implementation of CTB in the two
studies we cover or if it reflects some behavior that the standard discounted utility
models (and hence the structural estimation methods used in the mentioned studies)
are not equipped to handle. We are of the opinion that inclusion of the wealth shifter
in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a) was a crucial design innovation, and we
recommend that future CTB papers include a similar ‘wealth shifter’ to facilitate
analysis. At a minimum, we would encourage future researchers to test their CTB
data for consistency with the internal measures of monotonicity before applying the
data in new settings or using it for the purpose of structural estimation.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the extremely
active literature on measuring time preferences. Section 3 discusses Andreoni and
Sprenger (2012a) in detail; we first describe how to identify wealth monotonicity,
demand monotonicity, impatience and WARP violations in the AS dataset, and then
present the results of our investigation. Section 4 provides a similar analysis of
Augenblick et al. (2015). Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature review
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a, b) have been among some of the most influential
experimental papers in recent years, generating a significant amount of academic
discussion about the experimental methodologies of estimating and understanding
risk and time preferences. The most significant contribution of Andreoni and
Sprenger (2012a) is the parsimony of the CTB framework for estimating time
preferences without explicitly relying on expected utility in order to adjust the
discount function for the curvature of the felicity function. The authors also do a
very convincing and careful job of equalizing the subject convenience and
confidence for present and future payments to measure present bias separately from
the confounds of differential transaction costs. Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a) find
very little evidence for present bias and curvature in the atemporal felicity function.
The closely related paper Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b) compares CTB decisions
in which payments on both dates are certain, to ones in which payments are risky, as
realized by two independent lotteries. The authors hypothesise that subjects’ choices
are governed by an (atemporal) utility function that is more concave than the one
employed under conditions of certainty, as subjects choose more balanced portfolios
of sooner and later payments under the risky condition.
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a, b) led a host of follow-up studies which have
used this methodology for estimation purposes. CTB has been otherwise used to
study the evidence for present bias among particular sectors of the population (e.g.
Gine´ et al. 2016; Ashton 2014; Kuhn et al. 2014; Carvalho et al. 2016). Aside from
being a huge influence on the experimental literature, Andreoni and Sprenger
(2012b) has also generated a range of comments on the robustness and interpretation
of its findings. Cheung (2015) investigates the robustness of AS (2012b) to
alternative experimental design. In a particularly interesting translation of the key
AS (2012b) CTB treatment into a double MPL environment, Cheung uses an MPL
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where payments on both dates are received with 50% probability, and contrary to
AS (2012b) he finds ‘‘very little evidence of difference of any systematic deviation
in discounting behavior under risk as compared to certainty.’’ Cheung also finds
evidence for non-linearity in intertemporal preferences when, in the absence of
diversification opportunities (the risks across time being correlated), the proportion
of interior allocations falls between those of no risk and independent risks. Miao and
Zhong (2015) utilize two additional CTB risk treatments (one of them similar to that
of Cheung) to show that the behavior exhibited in temporal risk environments is
more consistent with a model which separates risk attitudes and intertemporal
substitution (like Epstein and Zin 1989; Halevy 2008) than the one suggested in AS
(2012b). Epper and Fehr-Duda (2015) demonstrate that probability weighting in
rank-dependent utility models that take their entire temporal portfolios into account
are able to explain subjects’ preference for intertemporal diversification as well as
their proneness to intertemporal common-ratio violations and, therefore, all the
major AS findings. Schmidt (2014) offers a different perspective: if the monetary
payments in AS (2012a, b) are interpreted as income instead of as consumption,
then arbitrage and portfolio risk minimization in a DEU framework could justify
why subjects choose more interior solutions in the correlated temporal risk task than
in the deterministic temporal task.
Harrison et al. (2013) is another critical comment that directly addresses
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a). One of the key arguments of Harrison et al. (2013)
is that the large number of corner choices in the CTB data generates a bi-modal data
set which is not well suited to analysis via non-linear least squares estimation
techniques. The authors note that more appropriate econometric techniques, which
attempt to match the full distribution of the data, imply that the data is best
rationalized with a convex utility function. Furthermore, they argue that convex
utility functions are a priori implausible in this environment and they therefore
question the quality of the data.
Augenblick et al. (2015) has been the most successful behavioral application of
the CTB design. The authors use CTB to show present bias while using primary
rewards (effort tasks). For sake of comparison, they pair this effort study with a
companion monetary discounting study and find very limited time inconsistency in
monetary choices. We analyze in greater detail demand monotonicity violations in
the effort domain in Sect. 4.
3 Andreoni and Sprenger (2012)
The Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a) design includes nine choicesets per subject,
where each choiceset is a collection of five CTB tasks between payments at t and at
t þ k (where t ¼ 0; 7; 35 and k ¼ 35; 70; 98 measured in days). Eight out of the nine
choicesets contain a wealth shift which could be used to test for wealth
monotonicity. Demand monotonicity is tested by the other four CTB tasks within
a choiceset. Impatience is tested by comparing across choicesets belonging to the
same subject. When evaluating wealth monotonicity we allow for the non-generic
possibility of linear preferences with marginal rate of substitution between ct and
A. Chakraborty et al.
123
ctþk equal to the gross interest rate over k days in which the wealth shift occurs, i.e.
1 þ r ¼ 1:25. In this case, the demand is a correspondence and wealth monotonicity
as defined above need not hold.7
AS included three choice lists (MPL) that correspond to three choicesets. Each
one of these choice lists included four pairwise choices that corresponded to CTB.
In other words, on these lines of the choice list a subject was asked to make a
pairwise choice between the two points in which each CTB intersects the horizontal
axis (ctþk ¼ 0) and the vertical axis (ct ¼ 0). In the CTB task the menu of
allocations the subject was allowed to choose from included these two allocations
and all interior allocations. We use this set-up to test for violations of the Weak
Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP), which requires that if an alternative is
chosen from a menu and is available in a sub-menu then it should be chosen from
the sub-menu as well. If in the pairwise choice a subject chooses one corner while in
the CTB she chooses the opposite corner this contradicts WARP. The implication is
that there exists no complete and transitive preference that can rationalize these
choices.
3.1 Corner choices
Although the CTB design allowed for interior choices, 70% of all choices were
made at the corners of the budget set. 36 of the 97 subjects made only corner
choices. There is little within subject variation and between subject heterogeneity
among these subjects. Nineteen of these subjects had the exact same choice
sequence for all tasks: they chose the later-larger reward whenever the ‘‘gross
interest rate’’ was greater than 1. Four other subjects chose the later-larger reward
for all 45 CTB tasks, irrespective of interest rate and time horizon.
3.2 WARP violations
Out of the 36 subjects who made all corner choices in CTB, we found 43 violations
of WARP.8 This is especially impressive if one considers that 17 of them always
chose later consumption in the CTB and switched immediately in the choice lists
(always chose later consumption). Therefore WARP violations could be detected
only among the remaining 19 subjects. The direction of WARP violations is not
random: 34 violations are in the direction of exhibiting less impatience in CTB than
in choice list, while only 9 are in the opposite direction.
Since these subjects did not exhibit any curvature in their CTB choices, we can
directly estimate their discount factor based on the three choice lists and the
corresponding CTBs assuming linearity of the felicity function. One should not
7 We thank Andreoni and Sprenger for bringing up this possibility. However, to be consistent with this
knife edge case, subjects need to satisfy: (1) ct ¼ 0 for all r[ 0:25 and ctþk ¼ 0 for all r\0:25: (2) In
every choiceset ðt; k0Þ such that k0\k: ct ¼ 0 for all r 0:25: (3) In every choice set t; k0ð Þ such that
k0[ k: ctþk0 ¼ 0 for all r 0:25. (1) follows from linearity and (2–3) follow since the daily rate changes
as k varies.
8 The discussion in this subsection ignores indifferences since we believe that the evidence is systematic
and cannot be accounted for by the knife-edge arguments of linear preferences.
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adjust for curvature for these subjects, since their intertemporal decisions did not
suggest any concavity of the felicity function.9
The results are plotted in Fig. 1.10 We find that for 11 subjects the discount factor
estimated from CTB data would be higher than the one estimated from choice list
data, while for two subjects the relation between the discount factors would be in the
opposite direction. Note that the choices made by the 17 subjects who always chose
later consumption can be rationalized with a discount factor of 1, and one cannot
form a point estimate of the discount factors of 4 other subjects who always chose
immediate consumption in at least one of the three CTBs.11
Among the other 61 subjects who made at least a single interior choice in the 45
CTB tasks we find a similar directional effect of WARP violations. If one of the
three choicesets that has a comparable choice list has all corner choices, we find 23
WARP violations in the direction of exhibiting lower impatience in CTB than in
choice list and none in the opposite direction. In choicesets with interior CTB
choices (where the potential to observe direct WARP violation is smaller) we found
ten violations in the direction of exhibiting lower impatience in CTB than in choice
list and five in the opposite direction. It is important to note that owing to the WARP
violations, there is no model of complete and transitive preferences that could
potentially help us understand the correlation between impatience parameters
estimated via CTB and MPL (DMPL) techniques within or across studies.
The WARP violations indicate an inconsistency between choices elicited via
CTB and choices elicited via a choice list, and the strong correlation between
WARP violations and impatience measures suggest that the inconsistency is, in
some sense, structural rather than random. One possible interpretation of the WARP
violations [following Ok et al. (2015)] is that CTB induces a form of reference
dependence by moving away from binary choices.12 However, it could be argued
that a choice list may also be susceptible to reference dependence—consider for
example a list starting from low interest rates compared to a list starting from high
interest rates [see Andersen et al. (2006) for further discussion].
While the presence of inconsistency between the choices in the CTB and MPL
tasks does not necessarily privilege either elicitation procedure, the results are
nevertheless both disconcerting and very interesting. We believe that understanding
the nature of the discrepancies between the two elicitation mechanisms is an
important open question.
9 Following Harrison et al. (2013) it is important to note that linear felicity function cannot be identified
from convex functions using CTB. Under discounted expected utility one can adjust both axes of Fig. 1
using the risk MPL, only if the subject is risk seeking in the risk MPL (using the inequality
ct=ctþk [ u ctð Þ=u ctþk  for ct[ ctþk for convex u).
10 AS’ Fig. 4A is similar, but we restrict to subjects who made only corner choices and therefore there is
no need to adjust for concavity.
11 If one estimates a quasi-hyperbolic model based on these three CTBs or MPLs, the conclusions do not
change. In particular, the present-bias parameter (beta) under both elicitation methods is exactly 1 for 28
out of the 32 subjects.
12 Binary choice is by definition, free of such reference dependence or ‘‘attraction effect’’ in their model.
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3.3 Demand and wealth monotonicity
As the 36 subjects with all corner choices did not take advantage of the
convexification offered by the CTB, we believe it would be misleading to include
them in evaluating CTB for internal consistency (monotonicity). Hence, the analysis
below concentrates on the remaining 61 subjects with at least one interior choice.
3.3.1 Frequency
Table 1 reports the frequency of choicesets that have wealth or demand
monotonicity violations as a function of the number of interior choices made in a
choiceset.
The frequency of demand monotonicity violations is below 10% for choicesets
that contain 4 or fewer interior choices. However, more than 36% of choicesets with
all interior choices have demand monotonicity violations. The frequency of wealth
monotonicity violations is considerably higher: around half of the choicesets with at
least one interior choice have a wealth monotonicity violation.
Table 2 reports, for the 61 subjects with at least one interior choiceset, the
distribution of subjects satisfying wealth and demand monotonicity as a function of
the number of interior choicesets. A choiceset is considered interior if at least a
























CTB yearly discount factor
Choice list vs CTB esmates of 
discount factor
Fig. 1 Choice list versus CTB estimates of discount factor for the 36 all-corner subjects
13 Among the 36 subjects who made only corner choices, we find only one non-monotonic choiceset.
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Table 2 reveals that more than half of the 61 subjects violate monotonicity in at least
half of their interior choicesets (the bolded entries in the table).
3.3.2 Magnitude
The two tables above demonstrate the high frequency of non-monotone choices in
interior choicesets, especially as a response to wealth changes. We now turn to














# of choicesets that exhibit
either wealth or demand
monotonicity violations
0 435a 1 9 10
1 101 10 26 34
2 78 5 31 34
3 80 6 47 48
4 63 6 47 47
5 116 42 56 76
Total 873 70 216 249
a 324 out of the 435 choicesets with no interior choice (almost 75%) belong to the 36 subjects with only
corner solutions
Table 2 Joint frequency of number of interior choicesets (by subjects) and number of interior choicesets




# of monotone interiora choicesets Total
choicesets 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 0 2 2
2 1 0 0 1
3 2 0 0 2 4
4 0 2 0 0 1 3
5 1 1 0 0 2 1 5
6 0 2 0 0 0 1 1 4
7 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 4
8 0 3 2 0 0 2 1 1 0 9
9 1 8 5 4 2 0 2 2 0 5 29
Total 5 18 8 7 5 4 4 5 0 5 61
The bolded entries highlights subjects that had violations in half or more of their interior choicesets
a A choiceset is considered ‘‘interior’’ if at least a single choice (out of 5) is not at the corners of the
budget line
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measure the magnitude of these behaviors. We calculate the magnitude of a wealth
monotonicity violation by the number of tokens required to be reallocated in order
to eliminate the violation at the higher wealth level. Our wealth monotonicity
measure differs substantially from that reported in footnote 25 by Andreoni and
Sprenger (2012a). We find that there are 216 violations of wealth monotonicity,
with an average size of 24.46 tokens, which is 24.46% of the experimental budget or
$4.89 of ct at the higher wealth level.
14 That is, conditional on violating wealth
monotonicity, the magnitude of the measure is almost as high as the equivalent
measure calculated for random choice: if choices are generated at random using a
uniform distribution over the tokens allocated to ct, independently among the two
budget lines, the expected value of our measure would be approximately 27
tokens.15 Andreoni and Sprenger report an average adjustment of just 1.67 tokens to
restore wealth monotonicity. There are three differences between our calculation
procedure and the one used in AS (presented in decreasing order of importance).
First, we take the absolute value of violations. AS mistakenly defined non-
monotonicity that is expressed as an over-allocation to ctþk (and under-allocation to
ct) as a negative number, while non-monotonicity that is expressed as an under-
allocation to ctþk (and over-allocation to ct) as a positive number. Because both
over- and under-allocation to ctþk are prevalent across the population, violations
cancel out at the aggregate level. Taking the absolute value of the violations
accounts for 24% of the total discrepancy: starting from the 1.67 tokens reported in
AS, correcting for this increases the measure to 7.03 tokens. Second, accounting for
almost all of the residual discrepancy, we include only choicesets with a wealth
monotonicity violation in the denominator. In contrast, AS use a denominator that
includes all choicesets with a wealth shift, rather than just choicesets with a wealth
monotonicity violation. We believe that the AS approach, by including the 36
subjects who made only corner choices (and had no wealth monotonicity violation),
artificially dilutes the magnitude of monotonicity violations performed by subjects
who responded to the convexification offered by the CTB design by making interior
choices. Of course, this is mostly an accounting decision, and hence, we consider it
less important than our first point of departure. Lastly, we measure violations using
whole numbers of tokens, thereby reflecting the choice environment presented to
subjects, accounting for less than .5% of the total discrepancy. AS use integer
number of tokens when calculating the magnitude of demand monotonicity
violations, but not when calculating the magnitude of wealth monotonicity
violations.
Turning now to demand monotonicity, we calculate the magnitude of demand
monotonicity violations by finding the minimal amount of ct that needs to be
reallocated per choiceset to restore monotonicity. There are 70 choicesets with
14 If we apply a stricter test for subjects with potentially linear preferences (see footnote 7 for details), it
affects only 8 choicesets decreasing the average size to 23.2 tokens.
15 By comparison, the AS measure of wealth monotonicity violation as calculated and reported in
footnote 25 of their paper, would equal zero in expectation under the assumption of uniform random
choice.
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demand monotonicity violations, with an average size of 17.4 tokens and a value (at
time t) of $3.02.16
Another measure of the degree of non-monotonicity within a choiceset is to
calculate the smallest number of choices that must be removed from a choiceset to
restore monotonicity.17 For the 249 choicesets that exhibit at least one non-
monotonicity, the average number of data points that must be removed is 1.2. This
figure includes the 179 choicesets that exhibit only wealth non-monotonicity and
therefore require the removal of only a single data point; for the 70 choicesets that
exhibit demand non-monotonicity the average number of data points that must be
removed is 1.8.
There is a possibility that the income non-monotonicity we identify is an
outcome of subjects exhibiting different temporal preferences for different stakes,
known in the literature as the magnitude effect (see Thaler 1981; Frederick et al.
2002). In studies that vary the outcome sizes, subjects appear to exhibit greater
patience toward larger rewards. There are 152 instances of wealth monotonicity
violations consistent with the subjects exhibiting greater patience, and 64 instances
of the same in the opposite direction. The average size of reallocation required to
restore monotonicity is 19.77 and 30.90 tokens, respectively. As a result, we suspect
that the magnitude effect by itself is not sufficient to explain the frequency and
magnitude of wealth monotonicity violations resulting from miniscule changes in
budget wealth. In any case, whether ‘‘magnitude effect’’ is the correct interpretation
of this phenomenon is an open question that future research would hopefully shed
light on. One step in that direction is the recent work of Sun and Potters (2016),
which reports a significant ‘‘magnitude effect’’ in CTB tasks.
3.4 Impatience monotonicity
Turning to impatience, there are 10 pairs of choicesets across which either t is
constant and k varies, or t þ k is constant and t varies; these are the only pairs of
choicesets in which it is possible to test for impatience. In a comparable pair of
choicesets (in the sense described above), we test for impatience monotonicity as
described in Sect. 1.1 for all pairs of choice tasks (one in each choiceset) with the
same prices.
We find that 47 of the 97 subjects satisfy the impatience criterion for all 10 pairs
of choicesets; restricting the sample to the 61 subjects with at least one interior
choice, we find that only 12 subjects made choices consistent with impatience
monotonicity, and that 17 subjects violate impatience monotonicity in at least 5 of
the 10 choiceset comparisons.
16 AS report 8 demand monotonicity violations for the (t ¼ 7; k ¼ 70) choiceset with an average
magnitude of 24.6 tokens; in comparison, we find only 7 violations with an average magnitude of 23.4
tokens in this choiceset. AS appear to have erroneously included additional adjustments for ctþk , and
correcting for this reduces both the number and magnitude of demand monotonicity violations slightly.
17 When removing data points to restore monotonicity we also consider joint violations of demand and
wealth monotonicity.
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3.5 Monotonicity index
Finally, we calculate an index that measures the (approximate) minimal number of
data points that need to be eliminated from an individual’s dataset in order to be
consistent with the three monotonicity requirements. This index is close in spirit to
the Houtman–Maks (1985) index which is used to calculate the maximal set of
observations in a dataset that is consistent with the generalized axiom of revealed
preference (GARP).18 Out of the 36 subjects with no interior choice, 35 subjects
satisfy all monotonicity measures.19 Out of the 61 subjects with at least a single
interior choice, in 22 datasets we need to remove four or fewer choices,20 in 21
datasets we need to remove between five to nine choices (more than 10% of choices)
and in an additional 18 datasets one needs to remove 10 or more choices (more than
20% of the total number of choices).
4 Augenblick et al. (2015)
One critique that can be levelled against measuring time preferences using monetary
payments, as in AS (2012a), is that subjects’ responses may be driven by their
access to credit and savings instruments rather than their underlying time
preferences over consumption bundles. Augenblick et al. (2015) build on this
argument, and compare the preferences elicited through CTB design using both
monetary payments and effort tasks, where the effort tasks are possibly non-fungible
and assumed to impose a dis-utility on the subject and therefore allow a direct
measurement of time preferences with respect to the work-leisure trade off. In their
first study (henceforth original experiment) subjects allocate both cash and units of
effort over two dates, using a within-subject design. They also run a second study
(henceforth replication experiment) in which they implement a between-subject
design to replicate the findings of the first study. Augenblick et al. (2015) identify
two key differences between the monetary tasks and the effort tasks. First, present
bias is found only in the effort domain and, second, the proportion of interior
choices is much higher in the effort domain. This result supports the critique of
monetary tasks as a tool for measuring impatience due to the fungibility of money.
In the following subsections we analyze the rate of violations of our behavioral
desiderata across both the monetary and effort tasks. We believe it is a useful
exercise for three reasons. First, Augenblick et al. (2015) has been the most
influential application of CTB on ‘‘primary versus monetary rewards’’, a topic that
is contested between some behavioral and experimental economists. Second, the
interface used in the Augenblick et al. (2015) is different from the one used in AS
(2012a), so it allows us to evaluate if the demand monotonicity we documented in
18 Because the AS (2012a) design has no power to detect violations of GARP, any choices made in a
choiceset can be rationalized by a utility function, and by Afriat’s theorem the utility function can be
chosen to be increasing in ct; ctþkð Þ. This, however, should not be confused with wealth monotonicity,
which is a property of the demand function.
19 For the other subject, one needs to remove a single choice.
20 Only 9 of the 61 subjects made choices fully consistent with monotonicity.
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the latter is a consequence of interface subjects faced in the original AS study.
Third, one key implication of our data analysis for the design of future CTB
experiments revolves around the divisibility of effort tasks, and we will discuss this
issue in detail in Sect. 4.1.1.
4.1 Data Analysis
Because the Augenblick et al. (2015) design does not include a wealth shift, we
are not able to test their data for wealth monotonicity. Instead, we calculate the rate
of demand monotonicity violations for the effort tasks in the original study and find
the frequency of violations to be higher than the rate of violations in AS (27.8%
compared to 8.0%).21;22 As in AS, the rate of violations is higher when all choices
are interior (Table 3), 40.9% of choicesets with all interior choices have demand
monotonicity violations (the corresponding proportion in AS is 36.2%) Table 4
displays the number of demand monotonicity violations in the monetary allocations;
the rate of violations is rather low, as might be expected given that almost all
choices are corner choices. For impatience monotonicity, there is very little
evidence of violations for both effort tasks and monetary choices in the original
study, and there was no scope for impatience monotonicity violations in the
replication study.
4.1.1 Rounding of choices and classical monotonicity violations
One key aspect to consider when implementing CTB over effort tasks rather than
over monetary rewards is the divisibility of the units. Because the effort tasks in
Augenblick et al. (2015) are discrete, there is a complication in offering finely
distributed discrete choices on a budget line. Augenblick et al. (2015) deal with this
in two different ways: in the original experiment they vary the possible work
Table 3 Original study, work
data
Number of interior choices
(rows) crossed with number of
demand monotonicity violations
(cols)
# of interior # of demand Total
choices monotonicity violations
0 1 2 3 4
0 77 0 0 0 0 77
1 150 0 1 0 0 151
2 15 8 1 0 0 24
3 26 15 4 0 0 45
4 28 12 2 0 2 44
5 224 62 51 22 20 379
Total 520 97 59 22 22 720
21 200/720 compared to 70/873. Even when excluding choicesets with no interior choices the difference
is high: 200/643 = 31.1% compared to 69/440 = 15.7%.
22 We comment on the same for the replication study effort tasks in the next subsection.
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allocations in the nearer period on a regular integer grid (presented to subjects as a
slider), and then round-down the corresponding values of the other farther period
choice using the budget equation.23 This rounding method can, for some interest
rates, lead to the availability of dominated allocations. For example, when the task
rate is 1.5, and et may be chosen to lie between 0 and 50, then the allocations
ðet; etþkÞ ¼ ð2; 32Þ and ðet; etþkÞ ¼ ð1; 32Þ are both available.
In the replication, the authors considered all possible pairs of earlier and later
effort choices that would be on the budget line, and then rounded both of them
(independently) to the nearest integer. This rounding method can create situations in
which for a given ‘‘task rate’’ subjects are offered allocations which are below or
above the budget line. For example ðet; etþkÞ ¼ ð41; 17Þ; ð40; 17Þ and ð40; 18Þ
appeared as possible choices (and each was chosen by at least some subjects) for
the same budget line.24 This implies that certain subjects chose allocations that are
strictly dominated by other available allocations. We identify such choices as
violations of classical monotonicity. The rate of such violations is alarmingly high
in the effort treatment of the replication data: 62 of the 95 subjects selected 8 or
more (out of a maximum possible 18) dominated allocations. Because of the nature
of the slider interface presented to subjects we think that subjects were probably
simply unaware that dominating choices were available.
The frequency of demand monotonicity violations is also high in the effort
treatment of the replication: only 45 out of the 190 total choicesets have no demand
monotonicity violations, which is a failure rate of 76.3%. Table 5 shows the number
of demand monotonicity violations for the effort tasks in the replication study. We
recognize that this high frequency of demand monotonicity violations might have
been due to subjects choosing ‘‘above budget-line’’ and ‘‘below budget-line’’
allocations on different offered budget sets, and that these choices may have been
driven by an unawareness of other nearby feasible allocations. For each observation
which would constitute a demand monotonicity violation along with a choice at the
Table 4 Original study, money
data
Number of interior choices
(rows) crossed with number of
demand monotonicity violations
(cols)
# of interior # of demand
choices monotonicity violations Total
0 1 2
0 289 0 0 289
1 35 2 0 37
2 9 0 0 9
3 5 7 1 13
4 3 2 2 7
5 23 5 2 30
Total 364 16 5 385
23 For example, when et ¼ 0 and task rate = 1.5, etþk ¼ b5001:5 c ¼ 33. Here et is the effort allocation in
period t which can vary from 0 to 50.
24 With discount rate R ¼ 1:05263 and total budget ¼ 60, all of ðet; etþkÞ ¼ ð40:6; 17:26Þ;
ð40:4; 17:47Þ; ð40:1; 17:78Þ satisfy the budget equation R  et þ etþk ¼ 60.
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adjacent lower discount rate, we first note if the higher, later-period effort choice at
the higher discount rate was above the budget line due to experimental design. In
this case, we ‘‘correct’’ the higher later period choice by moving it onto the budget
line (thus decreasing it), in an attempt to ‘‘remove’’ the demand monotonicity
violation. Similarly, for observations related to demand monotonicity violations, we
note if the lower later period effort at a lower discount rate was below the budget
line. As before, we ‘‘correct’’ this lower later period choice by moving it on the
budget line (thus increasing it), in an attempt to ‘‘remove’’ the demand monotonicity
violation. Using this modified data set, in Table 6, we report a more conservative
frequency of demand monotonicity violations. The frequency of violations is still
quite high (Table 6) as close to 63% of adjusted choicesets exhibit demand
monotonicity violation.
Another reasonable hypothesis is that higher frequency of failing demand
monotonicity in the replication experiment could be due to the fact that there are 9
Table 5 Replication study,
work data
Number of interior choices








0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 11 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12
1 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
5 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 4
6 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
7 5 2 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 11
8 7 5 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 17
9 12 25 43 26 12 6 2 1 7 134
Total 45 35 48 29 14 6 3 3 7 190
Table 6 Replication study,
work data
Number of interior choices
(rows) crossed with number of
demand monotonicity violations







0 1 2 3 4 5 7 8
0 11 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 12
1 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
5 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 4
6 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
7 5 4 0 1 0 0 1 0 11
8 7 6 2 0 0 1 1 0 17
9 37 34 29 15 11 3 0 5 134
Total 71 47 34 16 11 4 2 5 190
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discount rates rather than 5 (as in AS and the original experiment of Augenblick
et al.). One could select 5 of the 9 discount rates, and evaluate demand monotonicity
on that smaller set of choices for comparison.25 The demand monotonicity violation
rates in the reduced exercise are still high: 74 (before aforementioned ‘‘correction’’)
or 67 (after ‘‘correction’’) choicesets out of 190 choicesets (38.9 or 35.3%) have
demand monotonicity violations. For comparison, in the original experiment the
frequency was 200/720 (27.8%). Our conclusion is that the higher failure rate
cannot be attributed solely to the higher number of interest rates.
We think that the high frequency of classical monotonicity violations and
demand monotonicity violations, particularly the former, point out that certain
participating subjects were not always well versed with the choice environment,
thus failing to recognize and consider strictly better choices. Our suggestion to
future studies planning to implement CTB effort tasks, is to either use divisible
effort tasks or else follow the truncation of choices used by Augenblick et al. (2015)
in their original effort task experiment.
4.1.2 Classical monotonicity violation and time preferences
Finally, we touch on the question if there is a correlation between dynamically
inconsistent choices and classical monotonicity violations. Given that estimation of
present bias or lack thereof is one of the primary goals of Augenblick et al. (2015),
we think the relation between the frequency of violations and observed temporal
preferences is of primary importance. We use the following non-parametric method
to identify time consistent choices. Each subject makes 2 decisions of ðet; etþkÞ for
every discount rate, once at t ¼ 0 and again at t[ 0. For every discount rate, if the
subject allocates the same amount of effort at date t in both her choices
(je0t  ettj  1, i.e, allowing a tolerance of 1), we identify that pair as time-consistent,
otherwise we label the pair as dynamically inconsistent. Given that subjects make
such pairs of choices for 9 different discount rates, the subjects can have 0–9 total
pairs of time-consistent choices. In Table 7 we tabulate this number against the
number of classical monotonicity violations.26 We find that time inconsistency is
associated with classical monotonicity violations, so subjects with fewer dynam-
ically inconsistent choice pairs make fewer classical monotonicity violations than
the ones who have more.
25 Only 3 out of the 5 discount rates used in first effort experiment are presented in the replication study,
and hence for the other two we choose the closest approximate. In the original effort data R ¼
ð0:5; 0:75; 1; 1:25; 1:5Þ where the budget line is: et þ R  etþk ¼ 50 (R is called the ‘‘task rate’’ so R ¼
1=ð1 þ rÞ where r is the discount rate). In the replication experiment P ¼
ð0:666666; 0:8; 0:90909; 0:952381; 1; 1:05263; 1:111111; 1:25; 1:53846Þ where the budget line is P  et þ
etþk ¼ 60 (so P ¼ 1 þ r), therefore, the relevant values for effort would be P ¼ 0:66; 0:8; 1; 1:25; 1:54ð Þ.
26 Because the full 10  17 table is both unwieldy and has a sparsity index of 0.35, we present a
condensed version of the table. Clearly, the categorical cutoffs chosen can affect the degree of correlation
evident in the condensed table. Nevertheless, it is very clear from the raw data that subjects with moderate
to high numbers of classical monotonicity violations are more likely to make dynamically inconsistent
choices. Reinforcing this correlation is the fact that classical monotonicity violations, at the subject level,
are also correlated between the two decision making periods.
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The association between failure of classical monotonicity and time-inconsistency
is an interesting empirical relation that provides some additional insight into the
Augenblick et al. (2015) choice environment. Abiding by classical monotonicity is
a marker of ‘‘decision-making quality’’—choices that can be rationalized by an
increasing utility function (Choi et al. 2014). It follows that there is a relation
between the decision making quality and adherence to the normative standard of
time consistency. Moreover, ‘‘low-quality’’ decisions that are associated with time
inconsistent choices cannot be rationalized by any utility function, let alone by
quasi-hyperbolic discounting one.27 As before, with violations of income mono-
tonicity and WARP, we think this is a fascinating topic worthy of independent
future study.
5 Conclusion
Andreoni and Sprenger’s proposal to use CTB in order to measure time preferences
represents a potentially important methodological advance. In principle, assuming
discounted utility, such a method can allow a researcher to calculate a more precise
measurement of the discount function by controlling for intertemporal substitution,
without explicitly relying on expected utility. However, our examination of data
gathered by Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a) and Augenblick et al. (2015) using this
method uncovers some issues that need addressing.
Subjects who made only corner choices in CTB violate WARP very frequently
relative to the pairwise choice benchmark. This hints at choices being dependent on
the particular elicitation method and allows a relatively pessimistic interpretation
that at least one of the following, corner choices in CTB or MPL choices cannot be
interpreted as reflecting reasoned behavior or deep preferences. As a whole, the bias
of WARP violations relative to the pairwise choice benchmark is in the direction of
lower impatience (higher discount factor). Subjects with interior monetary choices








0–3 12 12 24
4–6 13 13 26
7–9 8 37 45
Total 33 62 95
Number of time inconsistent choices (rows) crossed with number of classical monotonicity violations
(cols). A Fisher’s exact test rejects the null hypothesis of independence at standard significance levels (p
¼ 0.04), suggesting a positive association between dynamic inconsistency and classical monotonicity
violations
27 This may be related to a finding in Halevy (2015) who finds that time consistency is tightly associated
time invariant (stable) choices.
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are broadly consistent with demand monotonicity (except when all choices are
interior) and the evidence for impatience monotonicity violations is moderate.
However, the high frequency and substantial magnitude of wealth monotonicity
violations in this data suggest that interior choices made in CTB (responding to the
convexification) may be incompatible with standard stable preferences.28
The Augenblick et al. (2015) study does not include some of the experimental
comparative-static controls from the AS (2012a) paper. In their original experiment,
we find that the rate of demand monotonicity violation in the effort task is
comparable to the rate in AS when all choices are interior, but their average
frequency is higher as there are many more interior choices. In the replication
experiment we find a very high rate of demand monotonicity violations and we
document that time inconsistent choices are positively associated with classical
monotonicity violations that were possible through the experimental interface,
suggesting a possible relation between rationalizable choices and time consistency.
We point out the importance of inclusion of demand monotonicity and wealth
monotonicity tests in experimental design as diagnostic tests of meaningful
economic behavior. Unfortunately, the data does not permit us to go a step further to
test our conjectures about the source of these problems. As more studies employing
CTBs that also include checks of our monotonicity measures are performed, we
would learn more about whether these patterns point to something systematic in
subject choices or are merely a result of the particular experimental interface. We
believe that further investigation into the origin of the regularities documented in
the present study is crucial for an informed interpretation of existing and new
experimental results utilizing CTB method and we look forward to exciting
insightful work in this field in the near future.
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